Israel Proposes Palestinian Statehood
Israel is facing an unprecedented diplomatic challenge. The current government has had to contend with a host of plagues, most of which are the result of poor decisions made by previous Israeli governments. The disastrous consequences of the withdrawal from Gaza, the fallout from Operation Cast Lead, the fallout from the Mavi Marmara Flotilla, and finally an American government that is not unsympathetic to Palestinian pleadings. Nonetheless, the Likud coalition cannotcontinue to blame previous governments. It must act. The Palestinian Authority (PA), has announced its intention to obtain a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in favor of Palestinian statehood. Israel should propose the resolution to the UNGA in September.
Palestinian diplomats are traveling across the world attempting to rally support for their initiative. This effort has been five years in the making – ever since Mahmoud Abbas succeeded Yasser Arafat as leader of the PA. The Palestinians automatically have the support of the nations that belong to the Arab League and the Islamic Organization Conference – a total of 1/3 of the UN’s member states. Their support is strong across Africa and Latin America. Thus, with at least one hundred nations in favor of such a resolution, its passage is a given.
The support of forty European and Western-oriented states is what is critical to the PA. So far, the diplomatic efforts of the US and Europe to deflect the Palestinians from approaching the UN in September have failed. They understand that such a move is likely to decrease the possibilities for a settlement, not increase them. Given this reality, the North Atlantic bloc will focus on crafting a vaguely-worded resolution. However, the PA needs more than just another resolution endorsing previous UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Any resolution that merely endorses UNSC 242, 338 and the moribund Oslo Process would – regardless of how many votes it garners – actually be a diplomatic defeat for the Palestinians.
There are four key points the Palestinians want included in a resolution. 1) a state with the June 1967 borders; 2) East Jerusalem as the capital of this state; 3) the “return” of Palestinian refugees; and 4) the branding of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories as “illegal.” Inclusion of these four points would constitute a diplomatic grand slam, and as noted above, is already guaranteed the support of at least 100 of the UN’s 180 member states. An additional point, calling on UN member states to provide the Palestinians with assistance in establishing their independence would also be a key feature of any resolution.
Can the Palestinian Authority accept a limited resolution? This would be a terrible defeat for the PA, a defeat upon which Hamas would try to capitalize. This would inevitably lead to another bloody round of fighting. Similarly, a resolution that calls only for modification of the 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem would be Pyrrhic victory. Hamas would instantly brand the PA’s acceptance of such a resolution as a betrayal of Palestinian rights. This would signal the end of the reconciliation agreement, and another round of violence.
This is why Israel should take the lead and propose a resolution that would significantly alter the dynamics of the conflict, and seriously limit the Palestinian Authority’s options. It will instead focus on a Palestinian state within secure and contiguous borders, and recognition of the borders established as a result of the armistice agreements signed with Arab states in 1949 and 1950. The main features of this would be similar to the Palestinian-sponsored resolution, but would slant the outcome even more heavily in Israel’s favor:
- A Palestinian state within secure and contiguous borders.
- Recognition of the 1948 Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines as the border of the Gaza area. This could also include the official demarcation of the Gaza-Israel maritime border, thus putting Lebanon on the hot seat.
- Recognition of the 1948 Jordanian-Israeli armistice lines from Al Burj eastward to the Dead Sea, with modifications in the Eshkolot, Sansana, Tene, Shaniand Mezadot Yehuda areas as the permanent border of Israel and the Palestinian area of Judea & Samaria.
- A corridor between the Palestinian area in Judea & Samaria and Gaza, under Palestinian control, albeit with Israeli sovereignty, will be stipulated. The route of the corridor, as well as overall engineering design, environmental impact and construction will be in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations. Note: this is already part of Oslo.
- A six-month moratorium on residential building in areas of Judea & Samaria that are outside the “Greater Jerusalem Basin.”
- Designation of the “Greater Jerusalem Basin” to include all of 1948 Jerusalem, as well as the neighborhoods of Gilo, Har Homa, East Talpiyot, Ramat Eshkol, French Hill, Ramat Shlomo, Ramat Allon, Pisgat Ze’ev, Neve Ya’akov, the Etzion Bloc and the Great Ma’ale Adumim area. The Arab villages of Anata, Hizma, Ar-Ram, Az-Za’ayyem, Sur Bahir and Al-Balad should be excluded from the Basin, as should the settlement of Atarot.
- Performing a census of the population in the Greater Jerusalem Basin.
- Issuing special identity cards for the population.
- Establishing regulatory mechanisms for the administration of 1) Antiquities, 2) Residential building, 3) Commercial & industrial building, 4) Education, 5) Energy, 6) Environment, 7) Telecommunications, 8) Tourism, 9) Transportation, 10) Labor and Social Affairs, 11) a Coordinating Administration responsible for the overall functioning of the other ten areas listed.
- Judicial matters (appointment of judges, establishment of courts, credentialing of attorneys, legislative matters) will be under the exclusive domain of the Israeli government.
- Security will be under the exclusive domain of the Israeli government.
- Taxation will be under the exclusive domain of the Israeli government.
- A plebiscite to be held in six months, in which all persons of voting age with a valid Greater Jerusalem Basin identity card will participate, to decide as to whether the Greater Jerusalem Basin will be under full Israeli sovereignty or continue to exist as outlined above.
Such a resolution – sponsored by Israel – would simultaneously create a separate identity for Jerusalem and at the same time ensure its indivisibility and Jewish majority. It would enshrine the democratic principle of “one-man, one-vote,” while at the same time preempting Palestinian attempts to signify alter Jewish demographic control. It would also give token victories to the Palestinians in terms of Jerusalem and settlements, albeit temporary ones that would expire in six months.
This would compel the Palestinians to the negotiating table. If not, a new status quo will be established – one given the imprimatur of the UNGA. If they fail to return to the negotiating table, Israel can hold the plebiscite, whose outcome is already assured. The Palestinians will have little recourse at the UN, and six months from September the US will be fully engaged in a presidential election.
Such a resolution – sponsored by Israel – would effectively diminish the Quartet, the UNGA and subsidiary bodies of the UN from initiating diplomatic and political proposals that invariably run counter to Israeli interests. Furthermore, it would significantly degrade the diplomatic and political achievements that the Palestinians have achieved over the last six years. It would ensure that Jerusalem and its surrounding environs remain intact and, at a minimum, under Jewish sovereignty.
One More Peace Plan
I am going to toss my hat into the ring on the issue of “jump-starting” Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. There is no deficit of peace initiatives floating around out there, and at worst, I will simply have to buy another hat.
Both sides seem to be content with negotiating with the media and courting public opinion. Neither side wants to make the next move. It is important to remember that since 1982 the Palestine Liberation Organization (the forerunner of the Palestinian Authority) was sitting in Tunis, after having been militarily defeated in the First Lebanon War. Israel made the first move in 1993, allowing Yasser Arafat and the PLO to set up shop in the West Bank as a legal entity for the first time ever.
So, without further introduction, my peace plan.
- A Palestinian state within secure and contiguous borders;
- Recognition of the 1948 Egyptian-Israeli armistice lines as the borders of Gaza;
- Recognition of the 1948 Jordanian-Israeli armistice lines from Al Burj eastward to the Dead Sea as the permanent border of Israel and the Palestinian area of Judea & Samaria; there would be border modifications (i.e. land-swaps) in the areas Eshkolot, Sansana, Tene, Shaniand Mezadot Yehuda;
- A corridor between the Palestinian area in Judea & Samaria and Gaza, under Palestinian control, albeit with Israeli sovereignty, will be stipulated. The route of the corridor, as well as overall engineering design, environmental impact and construction will be in accordance with Israeli laws and regulations;
- A six-month moratorium on residential building in areas of Judea & Samaria that are outside the “Greater Jerusalem Basin”;
- Designation of the “Greater Jerusalem Basin” to include all of 1948 Jerusalem, as well as the neighborhoods of Gilo, Har Homa, East Talpiyot, Ramat Eshkol, French Hill, Ramat Shlomo, Ramat Allon, Pisgat Ze’ev, Neve Ya’akov, the Etzion Bloc and the Great Ma’ale Adumim area. The Arab villages of Anata, Hizma, Ar-Ram, Az-Za’ayyem, Sur Bahir and Al-Balad should be excluded from the Basin, as should the settlement of Atarot. This will ensure a contiguous area within the Greater Jerusalem Basin.
Additional points that might considered under this include establishing:
- Performing a census of the population;
- Issuing special identity cards for the population;
- Establishing regulatory mechanisms for the administration of 1) Antiquities & Archeology, 2) Residential building, 3) Commercial building, 4) Education, 5) Energy, 6) Environment, 7) Telecommunications, 8) Tourism, 9) Transportation, 10) Labor and Social Affairs, 11) Justice, 12) Freedom of access to religious sites, 13) Industrial regulation, 14) a Coordinating Administration responsible for the overall functioning of the other areas listed.
- Security will be under the exclusive domain of the Israeli government.
- A plebiscite to be held in six months, in which all persons of voting age with a valid Greater Jerusalem Basin identity card will participate, to decide as to whether the Greater Jerusalem Basin will be under full Israeli sovereignty or continue to exist as outlined above.
- Removal from the jurisdiction of the UN General Assembly any and all questions pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and transfer of responsibility for said consideration to the UN Security Council. Israel-Palestinian issues shall also be removed from the agenda of all other bodies of the UN and UN-affiliated bodies, such as the International Labor Organization, Red Cross and UN Human Rights Commission.
The Palestinians must recognize the “Right of Return” as a non-starter. If the areas that the Palestinian Authority is claiming sovereignty over in the Judea & Samaria, a.k.a. the West Bank are to be free of Jewish settlements – in other words, Judenrein – then the Palestinians must accept the fact that mass immigration into Israel is not politically acceptable. In order to spur accept of this fact, the UN must dismantle UNRWA (by far the UN’s greatest failure in terms of managing refugees).
The Israeli government tomorrow could propose this. Similarly, the Israeli government could wait until September and propose this as a resolution in the UN General Assembly. Overall, a resolution of this sort would represent an achievement for Israeli diplomacy. Such a resolution – sponsored by Israel – would simultaneously create a separate identity for Jerusalem and at the same time ensure its indivisibility. It would enshrine the democratic principle of “one-man, one-vote,” while at the same time pre-empting Palestinian attempts to alter demographic realities. It would also give the Palestinians victories to in terms of Jerusalem and settlements.
Such a resolution – sponsored by Israel – would effectively eliminate the Quartet, the UN General Assembly and subsidiary bodies of the UN from initiating one-sided diplomatic and political proposals. This would compel both sides to the negotiating table. If not, a new status quo will be established – one given the imprimatur of the UN. If the Palestinians refuse to return to the negotiating table, Israel can still hold the Jerusalem plebiscite. Given that Arabs – both Christian and Muslim – currently living in the area already prefer Israeli rule, the outcome of the plebiscite will confer legitimacy on continued Israeli sovereignty, albeit in a different legal context.
Britain’s Iraq Inquiry – Lesson Learned?
The British Iraq War Inquiry has been dragging on since July 2009, and it’s ending is almost in sight. It’s chairman, Sir John Chilcot, hopes to issue a report by year’s end. It is increasingly clear that whatever tangible results that report may contain, they are likely to become lost in yet another wave of political bickering. Initially, its aims were laudable, even though controversial in some circles. Chiefly, to consider:
“ . . . the UK’s involvement in Iraq, including the way decisions were made and actions taken, to establish, as accurately as possible, what happened and to identify the lessons that can be learned. Those lessons will help ensure that, if we face similar situations in future, the government of the day is best equipped to respond to those situations in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country.”
The Inquiries scope was too large to begin with, spanning the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, covering the run-up to the conflict, the military action and its aftermath. Quite a few commentators, as well as reasonably-minded laymen, have lamented that fact that the terms of reference had not been more neatly compartmentalized.
Perhaps as a result, the Inquiry has devolved into a series of rancorous, ill-informed partisan debates. Each side (and there are several) fields battalions of analysts, bloggers, political pundits and would-be future candidates to deride the claims of its opponents and testimonies of witnesses. If the amount or ordinance lobbed into Iraq during the war had been equivalent to the amount of verbiage expended attacking and defending political positions, not a man, woman or child would have survived.
At some point, some “brilliant” parliamentarian will no doubt conclude that what is actually needed is a public inquiry on how to manage public inquiries!
Of course, such panels are necessary from time to time. When a course of action yields less than optimum results, it is worthwhile to step back and ask, “Why?” Democracies in particular need them in order to maintain the citizenry’s faith in the mechanisms of government. The Americans did this after 9/11. Up to that point in time, America spent something on the order of $20 billion or more annually on intelligence gathering and analysis. No matter: nineteen terrorists managed to highjack four aircraft and inflict a hitherto unimaginable amount of death and destruction on America.
America’s inquiry into those events resulted in a 900+ page report that contained over one hundred recommendations. To date, many of these have been implemented. Partially due to the implementation of these recommendations, but mainly as a result of the zealousness of law enforcement, there has been no repeat attack of such scale. However, many of the recommendation still have not been implemented. The reasons for non-implementation are numerous, including entrenched bureaucracies, limited budgets, legal challenges and the fluidity of events since the report was issued.
The difficulty of implementing lessons-learned is something that the British public, I suspect, is about to realize.
Apology necessary
About fifteen years ago, I was fortunate to find myself working under a very capable and talented manager. What did I learn from him? The list is short: attention to detail, planning, execution, initiative and finishing the job. “Putting the ball in end zone,” as he often said. Any successful organization, such as the one in which we were working, is a dynamic environment.
Consequently, sometimes the balance between planning and execution, or execution and putting the ball in the end zone, would get out-of-whack.
At times like those, it became necessary to hold people accountable. This is when I learned another valuable lesson: praise in public, criticize in private. Genuinely praising a person’s performance in a public forum raises awareness of what tasks need to be done and how they should be done. It sets a positive example. Criticizing in private allows for dialogue and discussion that permits one to learn from one’s mistakes in a dignified manner.
From this life-lesson, I derived a formula for making or accepting apologies. I do not know if it is truly unique or whether it is just such commonsense that no one has ever bothered to write it down. However, I would like to share the three basic principles of it.
First, an apology – and its acceptance – should be sincere.
Second, an apology should be delivered (and accepted) in the same forum in which the original offense was given.
Third, the person apologizing should not repeat the original offending behavior and the person originally insulted should not return it in-kind.
I’ll try to expand briefly on these three rules.
An apology that is made solely with the intention to avoid worsening a situation or in order to escape an unfavorable outcome is not sincere. Likewise, making an apology but excusing one’s behavior on circumstances (I didn’t sleep well last night, I’ve been under pressure at work, I didn’t like what you were implying, etc.) is not sincere. For the recipient, it is often difficult to accept a sincere apology, particular if the offense is still fresh. A cooling down period is often necessary.
Secondly, if an offense is made publicly, it should be redressed publicly. To do otherwise can leave the impression that a particular form of non-acceptable behavior is, in fact acceptable. In contrast, if some sort of offending behavior occurs in private, it is best for both parties to settle the matter privately. There is no need for public spectacles ala the sobbing confessions that are all too readily available on afternoon television. One doesn’t need to go on the Opera Winfrey Show to say, “I’m sorry.”
Finally, repeating the insult – either publicly or privately – is an indication that the original apology was insincere.
I cannot say with all honesty that I have been able to live up to my own standard consistently. I won’t dismiss my own failure to be consistent with the cliché ‘We’re all human beings, we’re not perfect.’ Rather, I’d like to think that there is a level of perfection that we can all strive for, and that continuously striving for it helps all of us develop our potential more fully.
Israel, Palestine and the UN
INTRODUCTION
Israel is facing an unprecedented diplomatic challenge at the UN this fall. The current government has had to contend with a host of plagues, most of which are the result of poor decisions made by previous Israeli governments, but not all. The disastrous consequences of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (Sharon), the fallout from Operation Cast Lead (Olmert/ Barak/ Livni), the fallout from the Mavi Marmara Flotilla (Netanyahu/Barak), and finally an American government that is not unsympathetic to Palestinian pleadings. However, in order to capitalize on this situation, the Palestinians must control a number of factors: diplomatic, economic, military and political.
Strategic Strengths and Weaknesses. The combined economic strength of both Gaza and the West Bank (excluding Jewish developed areas) is approximately 1/40th of Israel’s. Economically, there is no contest. A similar situation exists on the security level. While much commotion has been made about the success of the PA’s American-trained security forces, it must be remembered that we are talking about approximately 2000 security forces. Israel deployed only 10,000 troops in Operation Cast Lead in 2008 and was able to effectively control all of Gaza – and Hamas had an equal number of combatants at its disposal. Politically, the PA is much more unified than Bibi Netanyahu’s coalition government in Israel. However, this agreement has not benefited the PA at all.
Thus, the PA’s strength is in its diplomatic strategy. This is exactly where Israel is weakest. The PLO – the Palestinian Authority’s forerunner – has spent the last forty years developing a network of relationships across the Arab and Muslim worlds, as well as across the LDCs (Less Developed Countries) of Africa. Although it has lost the support of the formerly communist East European nations, it still has significant backing in Russia, as well as China, Cuba and Venezuela. Latin American nations have started aligning themselves with the Palestinians due to a combination of economic and regional political circumstances.
Is this situation a recipe for disaster? Given the current realities there is a high probability that some sort of military confrontation will take place. This probability exists on every path that either the Israeli or the Palestinians might choose to take. The question thus becomes, who will decide when and where it will occur? If so, preparations must be made at all levels – diplomatic, economic, political and security – to minimize its impact. Israeli leaders should be under no illusion that there will be a sudden realization across the world that Israel is the besieged party in this conflict. Western principles of democracy, freedom of speech, freedom religion, due process, etc. are given only lip service by Western politicians. These are forgotten, unknown or despised concepts for ¾’s of the world’s states.
THE SITUATION AT THE UN
The PA intends to seek a resolution from the UN in favor of Palestinian statehood at the next General Assembly session. Palestinian diplomats are traveling across the world attempting to rally support for their initiative. The support of the nations that belong to the Arab League and the Islamic Organization Conference (IOC) – a total of more than 1/3 of the UN’s member states – is a given. Likewise, there is strong support across Africa and Latin America due to a variety of factors. Thus, with at least one hundred nations in favor of such a resolution, its passage is a given.
The support of forty European and Western-oriented states is what is critical to the PA. In order to garner their support, any resolution must be carefully worded. The PA needs more than another General Assembly resolution endorsing peace based on previous UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, particularly 242 and 338. Any resolution that merely endorses UNSC 242, 338 and the moribund Oslo Process would – regardless of how many votes it garners – actually be a diplomatic defeat for the Palestinians.
There are four key points the Palestinians want included in a resolution. 1) a state with the June 1967 borders; 2) East Jerusalem as the capital of this state; 3) the “return” of Palestinian refugees; and 4) the branding of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories as “illegal.” Inclusion of these four points would constitute a diplomatic grand slam, and as noted above, the Palestinians are already guaranteed the support of at least 100 of the UN’s 180 member states. An additional point, calling on UN member states to provide the Palestinians with assistance in establishing their independence would also be a key feature of any resolution.
Western capitals are currently not receiving these key points very well. The Americans and Europeans will never convince Israel to return to what Golda Meir described as the “suicide borders” of 1967. Given the fact that Hamas has launched over 12000 projectiles into Israel after Israel withdrew is a fact not lost on either the Americans or Europeans – except for the most Anti-Semitic left-wing extremists among them. However, the Americans and Europeans are looking for one side or another to indicate a small degree of compromise.
Just as the June 1967 borders are a non-starter, so is the return of Palestinian refugees, which would create a demographic and economic catastrophe. The return of any significant number of the so-called refugees to Israel would create a demographic and political nightmare. However, Israel is at least technically capable of absorbing immigration on an economic level. The Palestinian Authority – completely dependent on Israel for collecting 70% of its tax revenues and dependent on the US & Europe for $1 billion annually (four times more than the Arab states combined donate) – would completely collapse.
Europeans are not opposed to the idea of dividing Jerusalem, however. Jewish neighborhoods and cities north, south and east of Eat Jerusalem complicate this question, another reason the Palestinians will seek to have the “settlements” declared illegal. All Western governments have stated that the “settlements” are illegal. This is despite the fact that the legal status of the settlements is murky, at best. (Again, Western governments are only too willing to look the other way as Third World dictatorships chip away western concepts such as the due process and the sovereignty of law.) Thus, on two issues (Jerusalem and Settlements) the Palestinians can look forward to significant support.
PALESTINIAN POLITICS
The recently signed reconciliation agreement creates significant hurdles for both parties. While the agreement makes perfect sense from a Hamas view point, it has already given the Palestinian Authority (created by the Palestine Liberation Organization – the PLO) headaches. Hamas has refused in every statement it has issued since the reconciliation pact was signed to move to a more moderate, i.e. Palestinian Authority position. Thus, Hamas maintains, even enhances, its credibility as the party “confronting Israeli occupation.” The PA bears the costs. Israel has suspended the transfer of tax revenues and Abbas & Co., have been engaged in a diplomatic rear-guard action ever since the reconciliation agreement was signed.
Can the PA be induced to abandon the reconciliation agreement? This is not likely due to a number of factors. The on-going political unrest in the Arab world is having a profound affect on the Palestinian psyche. The Palestinian people in both Gaza and the Occupied Territories want to see more progress. Neither Hamas nor the PA were able to co-opt the limited popular demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank, but they were not harmed by their abbreviated nature. Neither side can be certain of such an outcome if the demonstrations are re-launched.
Egypt has stopped being exclusively pro-PA and is now taking measures that significantly strengthen Hamas politically and materially. Meanwhile, there has been an increase in antipathy towards the Palestinians in Jordan, which is having an effect on the PA. The Syrian regime has been too pre-occupied with its own domestic problems to weigh in on matters, but occasionally points an accusatory finger at Hamas representatives in Damascus. If it were to annul the agreement, the PA’s credibility as a politically-mature institution capable of governing and independent state would suffer greatly.
Can the Palestinian Authority accept a resolution that calls only for modification of the 1967 borders and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem? This is not likely, as Hamas would instantly brand the PA’s acceptance of such a resolution as a betrayal of Palestinian rights. This would signal the end of the reconciliation agreement. The PA would much rather receive “only” one hundred votes than have Hamas, and by extension Iran, Syria and Hezbollah aligned against it. A watered-down resolution would almost certainly trigger another round of fighting in Gaza, as Hamas attempts to prove it is more capable of fighting for Palestinian rights than the Palestinian Authority.
Where is the next bin Laden?
A single fact has gone unmentioned in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s assassination. The American public is too busy pumping their fists in the air, but that is to be expected of the general public. Obsessed with ratings, America’s infotainment industry (the mainstream media) has ignored this looming issue, as well. Nature abhors a vacuum, and human nature loathes it even more. Someone will step up and take the place of Osama bin Laden.
The Shi’ite sect of Islam has Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, but he is limited by his Iranian nationality. He must also contend with Iran’s potent Shi’ite clergy and a battery of western sanctions against Iran. Hezbollah’s Sheikh Nasrallah in Lebanon is constrained by his relationship with Ahmadinejad. Hamas, while dangerous, is ridden with behind-the-scenes power struggles and is primarily focused on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Muqtada al Sadr of Iraq, while locally powerful, does not have the theological acumen to become a truly transnational Shi’ite leader. He also lacks a secure powerbase in Iraq. Thus, Ahmadinejad will continue to lead Shi’ite fundamentalism for the time being.
Who will become the next Sunni fundamentalist transnational leader? The bin Laden clan’s ancestral homeland was northern Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The former hosts al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP, for short. However, it is also experiencing a whiff of “Arab Spring” in the form of pro-democracy demonstrations, as well as being racked by an intermittent civil war. Yemen will continue to be unstable, but is unlikely to produce a leader capable of meeting the urban elite’s demands for greater democracy and calls for increased tribal authority, while establishing a Sunni fundamentalist regime.
Born in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden only emerged as a leader during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. There is a reason for this. The Saudi regime is just as oppressive – even more so in some respects – than the recently fallen autocracies in Tunisia and Egypt. Wahhabism – Saudi’s puritanical brand of Sunni Islam – serves the interests of the royal family first. No Wahhabi cleric will arise to challenge that hegemony. It is even less likely that one of the kingdom’s 200 royal princes will attempt to transform himself to something above the Saudi monarchy.
One bet is Egypt, the home of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood is the oldest of the modern fundamentalist movements. It has already stated its intention to contest up to half the seats in the country upcoming parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood is by far the most organized of the myriad political parties that have sprung up in the wake of Mubarrak’s demise. It is also the most disciplined. There is little doubt that if they were to contest all the seats, they would walk away with a working majority. However, this is something that might very well trigger a Nasserist coup by the Army.
It has watched both Shi’ite electoral success in Lebanon and Sunni success electoral success in Turkey with great interest. In both countries, fundamentalists have slowly consolidated power for years. They use the legitimacy that electoral success affords to whittle away at democracy’s institutions slowly, from the inside. In both instances, the military has been neutered and the independent judiciary subjugated to political control.
Will this be the Brotherhood’s tactic in Egypt? If successful, can they lead an impoverished nation of 80 million, while at the same time assuming a transnational leadership of the Sunni fundamentalist movement? Nasser attempted that fifty years ago and ultimately failed. However, Nasser had few roles models, operated in a world split with East and West tensions, and was subject to the demands of maintaining an aggressive stance towards Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood has a number of successful models to copy. The East-West conflict is dead (for the most part), but the West has not been successful in consolidating its victory. Currently, Egypt enjoys the fruits of a cold peace with Israel.
Thus the question is, can Egypt produce a leader of bin Laden’s stature? Does it want to?
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